Contatto di riferimento: Giovanna Corsi
Partecipanti: Nuno Venturinha - Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Abstract
My first aim in this paper is to discuss the criticism made by Bolzano of the Kantian concept of Fürwahrhalten, literally “holding” – or “taking” – “for true”, as well as the scepticism he identifies in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, which, I shall argue, is already practically-oriented. What I want to do next is to concentrate on Wittgenstein’s confrontation with, and assimilation of, the notion of Fürwahrhalten. Assuming in the 1930s and 1940s a forceful criticism of Frege’s anti-psychologism, one that has its roots in Bolzano, Wittgenstein claims that the only way to avoid non-psychological acts is to restrict ourselves to abstract logical entities. In all our day-to-day business with experience we are already holding the multiple bits for true as long as grammatical rules are followed.