Libet’s findings on the neural precursors of volition show a gradual build-up of electrical negativity (RP) preceding the reported time of conscious awareness of wanting to make a movement. The RP has been interpreted as the signal of planning, preparing and initiating the action, although its origin remains a matter of debate. If spontaneous decisions to move are preceded by unconscious neural antecedents, seemingly relevant conscious processes may not play a causal role in action initiation.
Libet’s findings have been replicated with a range of different techniques. However, with few notable exceptions, research on the precursors of volition has mostly focussed on meaningless actions, i.e., actions that select between alternatives leading to random outcomes. Understanding the nature of meaningful actions is crucial to the extent that our free will and responsibility depend on our ability to execute sequences of actions that seemingly incorporate conscious mental states and preferences we care about.
Indeed, philosophical models of intention and action emphasise the capacity to act for reasons (reasons-responsiveness) and in view of a goal (goal-directedness), often in relation to long-term planning (distal intention). In the talk, first I will discuss the challenges traditionally associated with studying the neural correlates of volition. Second, I will present an EEG study on the neural precursors of meaningful vs. meaningless actions with the aim of contributing to the ongoing debate on the mechanisms underlying volition.
