Cogito-Unibo

Principal Investigator  - Giorgio Volpe

Research topics

Cogito-Unibo is the Bologna-based unit of Cogito, a Research Centre which started in January 2009 as an informal research group.

The Bologna-based unit of Cogito aims to promote research and foster international cooperation on specific projects in the tradition of analytic philosophy. In recent years the group’s research has focussed especially on themes in:

1. the philosophy of language, with projects on ‘Predication, context, and relativism’, ‘Alethic and logical pluralism’, ‘Indeterminacy and fundamentality’, and ‘Constitutive norms’;
2. the history of analytic philosophy, with a project on ‘The grandfathers of analytic philosophy’, studying the role played by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the origins of the analytic tradition;
3. epistemology, with projects on ‘Immediate justifications, scepticism, and knowledge of mental states”, “Epistemology of testimony”, “Experimental philosophy”, “Knowledge, facts, and propositions”, “Epistemological contrastivism”, and “Explanationist strategies against scepticism”.

Members

Enrico Liverani

Eugenio Orlandelli

Elena Tassoni

Fancesco Antonio Zaccarini

Luca Zanetti

Events

Cogito-Unibo organizes (on occasion in collaboration with other research groups) research and reading seminars, workshops, and conferences. The so-called ‘Cogito Days’ are attended by members from the larger Cogito group. Major past events include:

Workshops: Themes from Eva Picardi (2-3 April 2009), Relativism and Disagreement Workshop 1 (20-21 May 2011), Perception Day (22 June 2011), Wittgenstein Day (23 June 2011), Perception Day 2 (15 March 2012), Truth and Reference (25 February 2013), Pluralism 1: Truth, Logic, Ontology and Epistemology (21-23 June 2015), Pluralism 2: Pluralism and Normativity (22-24 October 2015), Pluralism 3 (19-21 December 2016), Disagreement: Current Topics (21-22 September 2017), Constitutive Norms and Transcendental Arguments (26 April 2018), Normativity and Metaphysics (11 April 2019), Post-Truth: Philosophy, Sociology, and Media Studies (9-11 December 2019).

Conferences: Second SIFA Graduate Conference (29-31 October 2009), Truth and Relativism Conference (5-6 June 2010), Skepticism and Justification Conference (17-18 December 2010), European Epistemology Network Meeting (28-30 June 2012).

Cogito days: Cogito Day 1 (10 June 2009), Cogito Day 2 (7 July 2009), Cogito Day 3 (12 January 2010 ), Cogito Day 4 (24 May 2010), Cogito Day 5 (26 January 2011), Cogito Day 6 (27 June 2011), Cogito Day 7 (20 December 2011), Cogito Day 8 (28 May 2013), Cogito Day 9 (19 December 2014).

ERC panels

• SH2_8 - Legal studies, constitutions, comparative law, human rights
• SH4_9 - Use of language: pragmatics, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, second language teaching and learning, lexicography, terminology
• SH4_10 - Philosophy of mind, epistemology and logic
• SH5_6 - Philosophy, history of philosophy

Collaborations

IUSS Pavia, University of Bonn, , University of Connecticut, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, University of Padua, University of Parma, University of Trieste, Yonsei University.

Selected publications

• Alai M., Sereni A., Volpe G.  (2015). Guest Editors’ Preface. DISCIPLINE FILOSOFICHE, 25(1), pp. 5-8.
• Coliva A., Moruzzi S. (2012). Truth Relativists Can't Trump Moral Progress. ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, 53, pp. 48-57.
• Coliva A., Moruzzi S., Volpe G. (2012). Guest Editor's Preface. DISCIPLINE FILOSOFICHE, 22(2), pp. 5-6.
• Coliva A., Moruzzi S., Volpe G. (2012). Introduction, SYNTHESE, 189, pp. 221-234.
• Ferrari F., Moruzzi S. (2018), Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 49, pp. 368-393.
• Moruzzi S. (2012). Vaghezza. Confini, cumuli e paradossi, Roma, Laterza, 2012.
• Moruzzi S. (2015). Relativismo aletico, asserzione e ritrattazione. ESERCIZI FILOSOFICI, 10, pp. 216-229.
• Moruzzi S., Volpe G. (2012). Che cosa serve per essere in disaccordo? In M.C. Amoretti, M. Vignolo (a cura di), Disaccordo. Annuario della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica (SIFA), Milano, Mimesis, pp. 69-77.
• Moruzzi S., Volpe G. (2019). Interworld Disagreement. ERKENNTNIS, Online First (2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00171-w
• Volpe G. (2012). Cornerstones. You'd Better Believe Them, SYNTHESE, 189, pp. 317-336.
• Volpe G. (2012). La verità, Roma, Carocci.
• Volpe G. (2015). Truth and Justification: a Difference that Makes a Difference, PHILOSOPHIA, 43, pp. 217-232.
• Volpe G. (2017). Propositional and Doxastic Justification: Their Relationship and a Questionable Supervenience Claim. In B. Brozek, A. Rotolo, J. Stelmach (a cura di), Supervenience and Normativity, Cham, Springer, pp. 25-48.
• Volpe G. (2017). Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF SKEPTICISM, 7, pp. 258-271.
• Volpe G. (2018). Knowing the Facts: A Contrastivist Account of the Referential Opacity of Knowledge Attributions. In A. Coliva, P. Leonardi, S. Moruzzi (a cura di), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 401-420.
• Zanetti L. (2019). Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, 15, pp. 33-54.